Formally Defining Security Properties with Relations on Streams  by Lotz, Volkmar
p  
URL  http wwwelseviernllocateentcsvolumehtml  pages
Formally De ning Security Properties with
Relations on Streams
Volkmar Lotz
Siemens AG
Corporate Technology
D  Munich Germany
volkmar lotzmchp siemens de
Abstract
In this paper we show how to formally de ne security properties in the framework of
Focus a general approach for the speci cation and veri cation of reactive systems
In Focus systems are composed of components that communicate asynchronously
via unidirectional channels with their semantics being de ned by relating complete
input and output histories modeled by streams By taking into account practically
established methods from security engineering we de ne security as being a relation
between the system and a modi cation of the system describing relevant attack
situations The modi cation is called a threat scenario The relation speci es the
kind of deviation in system behaviour that is tolerable with respect to the given
protection needs We introduce generic relations covering authenticity integrity
availability and con dentiality By comparing our characterization with security
notions occurring in the literature and by sketching properties of our de nitions we
argue that our formalization of security is reasonable and adequate
  Introduction
With security becoming a more and more important and critical property in
today s systems in particular with respect to communications and electronic
commerce applications there is a growing need for means to provide rigorous
evidence that a system meets its security goals Since formal methods allow
reasoning about systems on mathematical grounds we aim at a technological
and methodological framework for the formal development of secure systems
In order to meet the challenge of proving systems secure we use the notion
formal development to emphasize that such an approach must cover both
formal requirements specication and the verication of mechanism suitability
and correctness The approach should not be biased towards particular secu
rity aspects concepts and measures To be suitable as an everyday security
reasoning tool it must allow to consider for instance noninterference issues
c
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in the context of a multilevel condentiality policy as well as transmission
security using cryptographic protocols
In this paper we focus on the security requirements part of a method as
outlined above In particular this includes means to dene a system s secu
rity objectives Following widely accepted pragmatic approaches for example
those underlying security evaluation criteria like ITSEC  or CC 	 secu
rity objectives are dened in terms of protection needs Protection needs are
described by the system s assets and the basic threats the assets are to be pro
tected against Assets may immediately correspond to system objects or they
have to be mapped onto system objects Basic threats are given for example
by loss of condentiality loss of integrity or loss of anonymity In many cases
relevant basic threats are given by an organisation or system security policy
To show that a system is secure one has to show that properties of the
system cannot be exploited by an attacker with the result of compromising
security objectives We thus arrive at a twofold security notion comprising
of a system specic part which describes an attacker s abilities based on sys
tem structure and behaviour and a policy oriented part describing protection
needs A system is called secure if its behaviour in attack situations and
its normal behaviour only deviate in a way admissible with respect to the
protection needs
This paper concentrates on the policy part of the security notion intro
duced above We introduce formal denitions of important security objective
classes These denitions are compared to formal and informal security de
nitions occurring in the literature The properties of our denitions show that
our characterization of security is adequate
The paper is structured as follows In Section 
 we introduce the techni
cal background our work is based upon It is given by Focus a general ap
proach to specication and verication of reactive systems utilizing relations
on streams to characterize semantics Section  describes the methodological
approach by explaining the views expressed above in more detail In Section
 we introduce formal denitions covering authenticity integrity availability
and condentiality It is argued that these denitions are reasonable We
give an overview of interesting properties of the security objective denitions
Though not worked out formally they show that the security objective model
is adequate and useful for the formal development of secure systems Section
	 concludes the paper
 Technical Background  The Focus Approach
To formally specify and reason about security we utilize a generalpurpose
formal method that is able to cope with reactive systems Focus
 models
a system as a set of components that interact with each other and the en
vironment by passing messages asynchronously through unidirectional typed
channels Syntactically a component is given by its environment interface
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ie the set of named input and output channels The behaviour of a compo
nent is characterized by relating complete channel histories of the environment
interface of a component or a system respectively
Communication histories are modeled by streams of messages which are
nite or innite sequences of messages Let M be an arbitrary set of messages
we dene M
 
 M
 
and M

to denote the set of streams nite streams and
innite streams of messages from M  respectively We have M
 
 M
 
 M


The empty stream is denoted by hi and the nite stream consisting of the n
messages m
 
 m

        m
n
is denoted by hm
 
m

       m
n
i Typical operations
on streams include concatenation s

t  length s ltering away elements not
in a given set A of messages A
S

s element selection s i  pointwise application
of functions maps f  and prex of length i sj
i
 With respect to the denition
of security the prex relation s v t and the substream relation s   t turn
out to be important The substream relation is given by s   t   h 
B it
 
 selt  h  s with sel being dened by  x  M
 
 h  B it
 
 selx  h 

 
M
T

x  h By
T

we denote the pointwise application of the lter
operator on tuples
The operators above are straightforwardly overloaded to tuples of streams
In particular A
S

s
 
        s
n
  A
S

s
 
       A
S

s
n
 lters each stream of
s
 
        s
n
 with respect to A and the substream relation is extended by
s
 
        s
n
   t
 
        t
n
 i s
 
  t
 
        s
n
  t
n

In order to model the progress of time we extend the concept of streams
to include timed streams In timed streams the special symbol
p
tick
which is not an element of M  occurs Each occurrence of
p
denotes that
a single time unit has passed Messages occurring between two successive
ticks are assumed to be communicated within the same time unit Since time
never halts each innite timed stream contains innitely many occurrences
of
p
 By M
 
 M
 
and M

we denote the set of timed streams nite timed
streams and innite timed streams of messages of M  respectively We have
M
 
 M
 
  M

 All of the operators on streams are also applicable to
timed streams with
p
treated as ordinary message Additionally particular
operators on timed streams are available for instance s
j
which describes the
prex of s up to the j th time unit
We use innite timed streams s  M
 
with f
p
g
S

s   to model
complete histories of a component s or a system s input or output channels
respectively
Components are described by elementary Focus specications Any ele
mentary specication is of the following syntactical form
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Name Keyword List
in Input Declarations
out Output Declarations
Body
Name is the name of the specication Keyword List lists a number of key
words imposing both syntactic and semantic constraints Input Declarations
lists the declarations of the input channels whereas Output Declarations lists
the declarations of the output channels A declaration consists of the channel
identier followed by its type
Body characterizes the relation between input and output channels thereby
specifying the component s behaviour Typically Body is a predicate logic
formula containing channel identiers as free variables Other body types
available include graphical descriptions or tables For instance tables oer a
convenient way to specify state transition systems Note that the specication
body allows to express underspecication as well as nondeterminism actually
no formal distinction is made between these two
Keywords are used to distinguish dierent specication formats that are
available in Focus For example time independent and time dependent are
used to determine whether the channel variables occurring in a specication
are to be interpreted as untimed or timed streams Though any specica
tion can be mapped to the timedependent format use of untimed streams
leads to more readable specications in cases where no timing properties have
to be considered Specications describing systems may show some system
structure In this case we distinguish between blackbox and glassbox spec
ications denoted by keywords black box and glass box Glassbox specica
tions require the structure to be maintained in further development steps
whereas blackbox specications are used to only specify the externally visible
behaviour
The semantics of a component is given by requiring input and output
streams to be correctly typed with respect to the channel declarations and
by interpreting the body formula Formally the denotation of a specication
S is given by the formula
 S   i
S
 I
S

 o
S
 O
S

 B
S

where B
S
denotes the body formula of S and I
S

and O
S

denote the sets of
stream tuples that are correctly typed with respect to the input and output
declarations of S The semantics of the specication is given by all pairs of
named inputoutput stream tuples satisfying the formula above
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However with respect to nondeterminism and renement the relational
approach turns out to be insucient to achieve compositionality cf 

for a detailed discussion of these topics We therefore only consider spec
ications that are strongly realizable Strong realizability reects the fact
that a specication can be implemented by a function mapping input his
tories to output histories where the output at a given point of time only
depends on the input up to that point of time including a delay of one
time unit Formally a function   I
S

	 O
S

is strongly guarded if
 x  y  I
S

 t  N  x 
t
 y
t

  x 
t 
  y
t 
holds We dene
the set of all strongly guarded functions realizing the specication S called
strategies by
str
S
S
def
 f  I
S

S
	 O
S

j  i
S
 I
S

  S 
o
S
i
S

 is valid  g
where A
S
	 B denotes the set of all strongly guarded functions from A to B 
and P 
s
t
 denotes the substitution of s by t in formula P 
A specication S is said to be strongly realizable if str
S
S  fg
After having introduced components and elementary specications we
turn our attention to composition In Focus components and their speci
cations are composed by identifying a subset of the input and output chan
nels occasionally with respect to appropriate renaming Due to the relational
approach composition is semantically given by the conjunction of the deno
tations of the components
Composition can be specied by using graphical constraint or operator
style In the graphical style components are depicted by boxes with incoming
or outgoing arrows denoting the input or output channels respectively Let
S
 
be a specication with two input channels i  l
 
and output channel l

 and
S

be a specication with input channel l

and output channels o l
 
 The
graphical composition of these two is shown in Fig 
S
1
i
l
1
l
2
o
S
2
Fig  Composition of S
 
and S

The constraint style allows to identify channels of components by explicitly
stating appropriate renamings in form of assignments In constraint style the
composition of Fig  is given by
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S
in i
out o
loc l

 l

l

 S
 
i  l
 
 o l
 
  S

l


Note that channels l
 
and l

are declared to be local thus explicating that the
external interface of the composed system is given by i and o The semantics
of the above composite specication is straightforwardly given by
 S    l
 
 l

 L
S

  S
 

i
S
 
o
S
 
il
 
l

   S


i
S

o
S

l

ol
 
 
where i
S
 
 o
S
 
 i
S

 and o
S

denote the input and output channels of S
 
and
S

 respectively The above can easily be extended to the general case with
the renaming substitutions immediately derived from the specication assign
ments
Additionally we introduce a general composition operator  mutual
feedback dened by  S
 
 S


def
  l  L

  S
 
   S

 which may
also be extended by using renaming substitutions By requiring parts of the
input and output channels of the components to be disjunct special cases of
the composition operator modeling sequential and parallel composition can be
derived
As an important result composition preserves strong guardedness and re
alizability
In Focus stepwise development of systems is supported by oering a set
of renement operators that can be used to add further detail to system and
component specications We distinguish between behavioral renement in
troducing additional constraints on the system s behaviour and thus removing
underspecication interface renement allowing to change the representation
of the system s interface and conditional renement stating additional re
strictions on the environment and thus reasonably weakening the concept of
behavioral and interface renement In the relational approach the behav
ioral renement S   S

where a system S is rened by S

is simply given by
implication of the denotations  S


  S  Interface renement S
DU 
  S

is performed with respect to downwards and upwards renement mappings D
and U  respectively which dene the abstraction relation between abstract
and concrete level With  denoting sequential composition its semantics
is given by  D  S  U  
  S  Conditional renement S  
B
S

in
troduces an environment condition B expressing for instance boundedness

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constraints and is semantically given by B   S  
  S  Obviously
interface and conditional renement can be easily combined
 Methodological Background
Besides the provision of appropriate formal techniques the formal develop
ment of secure systems requires some methodological background dening ac
tivities that have to be performed in order to specify security requirements and
to dene and implement suitable security measures In this section we turn
our attention to those methodological issues which are important with respect
to dene security properties and objectives See  for a more complete
investigation of methodological aspects of formally developing secure systems
As already stated in the introduction our notion of security is based upon
wellestablished pragmatic procedures including identication of assets spec
ication of protection needs in terms of basic threats mapping assets onto
system objects and assessing system vulnerabilities Actual security require
ments for a given system are derived from the results of threat identication
and risk analysis which assess the probability of threats occurring and their
possible impact on the system s protection needs Risk analysis decides on
whether and where to introduce countermeasures in case that the remaining
risk cannot be tolerated Altogether a system is considered to be secure if
even in case of an attack the protection needs are satised Tolerable risks are
captured by adding appropriate assumptions to the system specication We
thus arrive at a system specic security notion comprising of two parts

The system specic part models the results of risk analysis and identies
those components or communication channels of the system that are likely
to be attacked Possible attacks are specied on an appropriate abstraction
level by including a description of the adversary and his possible interaction
with the system We call the resulting specication a threat scenario A
threat scenario is typically given by a modication of the original system
specication Note that threat scenario construction requires the system
specication to already include some structure and level of detail thus re
ecting the fact that threat identication and risk analysis takes system
structure and functionality into account In general by T we denote a
threat scenario derived from a system specication S

The general or policy part expresses the system s protection needs by
specifying the admissible deviations between original system behaviour and
threat scenario Security is thus dened as a set of relations R
Sec
i
ST
corresponding to the protection needs Security relations express categories
of basic threats and are thus not system specic however the mapping of
protection needs to system objects determines the kind of relation that has
to be applied
The remainder of this paper is about the formal denition of security relations

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expressing authenticity integrity availability and condentiality in the Focus
model However we will have a short look at threat scenario construction
before turning to this subject Details and examples of threat scenarios can
be found in 

In general a threat scenario can be any modication of a system Relevant
threat scenarios do not constitute a renement of the system since in that
case the system itself would turn out to be secure anyway which is not given
in the general case However attacks and abilities of an adversary can be
classied leading to a set of modication operations which can be used to
schematically construct threat scenarios in cases where this is appropriate
A threat scenario T contains a subspecication modeling the adversary s
behaviour Thus we may write T  S

X with X being the adversary speci
cation S

is a modication of S including modied interfaces of components
of S as well as additional components describing the adversary s interaction
with the system The following operations can be applied in threat scenario
construction

adding additional output channels to system components modeling the leak
age of information stored or processed by the component This is used to
model passive attacks

replacing channels by components modeling active attacks on this channel
The additional component describes the type of adversary interaction which
can be expressed through basic operations like modication interception
etc A DolevYao style attacker  can be modeled this way We have used
this operation also to describe attackers that utilize a dedicated control
on communication channels eg to insert fake messages according to some
protocol specication 


replacing components or subsystems by new ones modeling an adversary
who is able to arbitrarily change a component s behaviour This is the most
general case which obviously does not show general properties that can be
utilized in schematic construction and reasoning about threat scenarios
Figure 
 shows the rst two of the above operations schematically in the
graphical composition style of Focus We expect these operations to be
sucient to model most of the relevant threat scenarios
 Security Relations
  Authenticity and Integrity
According to ISOIEC authenticity is the property that ensures that the
identity of a subject or resource is the one claimed  Following 
authenticity applies to entities such as users processes systems and infor
mation In our technical and methodological framework in particular by
characterizing a system in terms of its inputoutput behaviour and not refer
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Fig  Schematic threat scenario construction a adding channels b replacing
channels by components
ring to any special kind of security measures and mechanisms we interpret
this denition as authenticity being given if in the threat scenario specica
tion each output message of the system corresponds to a legitimate input
By legitimate we mean that each output is caused by a sequence of inputs
on the external interface of the system and not by messages inuenced by the
adversary However an authentic system needs not to respond to each of the
input messages The correspondence of our denition with the ISO deni
tion is immediately given even if messages do not contain identity or origin
information if one considers components as entities and messages carrying an
implicit identity or origin claim by being sent through a unidirectional channel
from entity A to entity B in the original system Each message received by B
on this channel is considered to claim being sent by A
In the following we denote by S the system which security is to be anal
ysed by T we denote the threat scenario derived from S with i and o denoting
the sets of named input and output stream tuples respectively For the dif
ferent security aspects we introduce formulae describing the security relation
R
Sec
i
ST corresponding to that aspect To make denitions more readable
we omit typing constraints and universal quantications where this is obvious
Formally our characterization of authenticity is given by
 T 
  i

 i

  i   S 
i
i
 

If i  o is an inputoutput behaviour of T we require i

 o to be a behaviour
of the original system S where i

is derived from i by removing those input
messages which are aected by an attack and thus are not responded to
The above notion of authenticity is rather strong in the sense of requiring
each message and each part of a single message to be authenticated In many
practical applications we are interested in considering weaker notions of au
thenticity An example is given by systems requiring entity authentication 
We therefore extend our denition by including abstractions on input streams
 T 
  i

 absi

   absi   S 
i
i
 

where abs is an appropriate abstraction function Examples of reasonable
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abstraction functions are given by s denotes an arbitrary stream tuple

abss  M D
S

s which abstracts from messages in a subset D of M 
thus requiring only messages from M D to be authenticated

abss  mapf  s which abstracts from parts of the contents of messages
occurring in s with this part being dened by f 

abss  s with  being a projection function on the stream tuple
s which abstracts from channels and thus requires only a subset of the
channels to be authentic
According to Roscoe s classication of extensional and intensional specica
tions  our denition of authenticity is completely extensional by consider
ing only externally visible events in specifying authenticity This is an imme
diate consequence of our methodological approach which species security on
the system level without taking particular mechanisms andor protocols into
account Mechanisms are selected to satisfy the system s security objectives
and any mechanism doing so is considered to be suitable However if inten
sional aspects are of importance they can be included by making the protocol
part of the system specication and adding special environment interactions
Lowe s classication of authentication specications 	 directly refers to
protocols and their structure and thus cannot be immediately compared to
our denition However if we consider the protocol specication itself as
the system that we investigate with respect to security and add appropriate
environment interactions corresponding to Lowe s signaling events our strong
notion of authentication is comparable to Lowe s agreement characterization
By dening appropriate abstraction functions we arrive at the weaker notions
including aliveness weak agreement and noninjective agreement
The notion of integrity can be easily integrated in our formal framework de
ned so far According to  integrity is the prevention of the unauthorized
modication of information In terms of our model this means that messages
are not tampered by the adversary when they are transmitted through the
system channels Taking the blackbox view of the threat scenario tampering
results in outputs not corresponding to the given inputs with respect to the
original system specication The only dierence to authenticity turns out to
be the fact that the origin of the messages is not considered to be relevant
We therefore dene integrity by
 T 
  i

 rngi

   rngi   S 
i
i
 

where rng abstracts from channel names by mapping tuples of named streams
to sets of streams Restrictions with respect to the typing of channels apply
and we need a substitution operator slightly dierent from the one used above
Details will be given in  Note that the above denition denes a strong
integrity notion which can as well be weakened by introducing abstraction
functions
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  Availability
 for instance denes availability as the prevention of the unauthorized
withholding of information or resources Since we assume that information is
provided through the system s functionality by interacting with the environ
ment the denition expresses the fact that with respect to security availability
is mainly considered as prevention of denial of service In the informal view
of our system model prevention of denial of service means that every input
message is eventually responded to However the threat scenario s output
stream may contain messages that not correspond to the system s input at its
environment interface and thus are the result of the adversary s interaction
with the system Formally we arrive at an availability denition that is dual
to our authenticity denition
 T 
  o

 o

  o   S 
o
o
 

Again this denition describes a rather strong notion of availability by re
quiring the threat scenario to respond to input messages in exactly the way
the system without being attacked would do There are cases in which some
kind of restricted behaviour in case of attacks occurring is tolerable We can
capture these cases by using abstraction functions as we have done in dening
the weaker variants of authenticity
In clientserver systems availability is typically considered to be given even
if requests are not served in the order in which they have been received Since
in our model requests correspond to input messages of the system we may
further weaken our denition by allowing the substream of the threat scenario
output to correspond to a permutation of the given input We thus have
 T 
  i

 o

 Permi

 i  o

  o   S 
io
i
 
o
 

where Perms t is a predicate that is valid if and only if s is a permutation
of t 
  Condentiality
In a general informal characterization condentiality means the prevention
of the unauthorized disclosure of information  In practice condential
ity requirements come in a number of avors ranging from preventing the
adversary from getting to know single data items in authentication and key
distribution protocols to noninterference with respect to a multilevel security
policy including eects of possible covert channels However noninterference
can be used to express a variety of security notions see eg 
We rst turn our attention towards the more simple cases of condentiality
which nevertheless are of high practical importance with respect to security
protocol design and implementation To express that an adversary should not
be able to get a particular piece of information we choose a noninterference

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 type of approach we consider the inuence that the adversary s interaction
with the system given by the threat scenario T has on the adversary s be
havior A system is considered to be condential if the adversary s behaviour
does not dier between the attack situation or the adversary operating in iso
lation From our viewpoint it thus does not form a compromise of security if
the attacker gets to know a data item but does not exploit it by changing his
behaviour Note that in order to make this viewpoint reasonable we have to
consider the complete ie innite possible behaviours of the adversary which
in our approach is implicitly given by the semantic characterization of compo
nent behaviour in Focus Recall that the Focus semantics relate complete
channel histories
A formal denition of the above kind of condentiality has to assume that
the threat scenario contains an explicit model of the adversary thus T  S

X
It also requires X to have a nonempty environment output interface otherwise
there would be no externally visible interaction
We dene a strong notion of condentiality by
 X 
c

p


n
  S

X j
I
X
O
X

where c  I
X
 O
S
 
is the set of channels through which the adversary gets
information from the system C is assumed to be of cardinality n Conden
tiality is given if the adversary s behaviour is equivalent in the threat scenario
and in a situation where no information leaks from the system to the adver
sary the rst situation is formally given by restricting the threat scenario
to the adversary s environment interface where in the latter case channels
from the system to the adversary are replaced by the innite timed stream
containing no messages
We require equivalence of the adversary s behaviour in the two situations
described above since the reduction of X s nondeterminism would indicate
an information ow However replacing equivalence by renement may be
adequate in certain situations
The security relation denition given above is purely extensional with re
spect to Roscoe s characterization  However intensional aspects can be
covered by using particular modelling aids in threat scenario construction For
example if the adversary keeps an internal state containing information he
gathered during system operation we may add an additional output chan
nel that nondeterministically outputs any element of the actual state If the
DolevYao style threat scenario is extended that way our model turns out to
be suitable to model condentiality requirements on key agreement protocols
The above denition can be extended to the multilevel case by including
restrictions on data being communicated from the system to the adversary
Let the set of data be partitioned into highlevel and lowlevel data items ie
D  H   L with H  L  fg and again T  S

 X and c  I
X
 O
S
 
 We

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dene a system to be multilevel condential if
 L
S

S

X j
I
X
O
X
   S

X j
I
X
O
X

with  L
S

S

  S


c
L
S

c
 denoting the system being restricted to processing
lowlevel data only
Note that in contrast to Roscoe s denition of noninterference by deter
minism  our condentiality notion does not restrict the nondeterminism
of the system in case of hiding highlevel events This is due to the dierent
viewpoint that we take by explicitly including the adversary specication and
the adversary s environment interaction condentiality in our denition refers
not to system behaviour but to adversary behaviour which is done by restrict
ing the threat scenario to the adversary s interface in the above denition
Note that in our approach it will also be possible to model  s notion of a
system being lazily secure by introducing a particular threat scenario in which
highlevel events are obscured by adding a merge component to channels from
the system to the adversary Such a merge component may arbitrarily add
highlevel events
   Properties of Security Relations
Adequacy and appropriateness of our formal denitions of security relations
are supported by a number of properties that can be derived from the de
nitions and that considerably well match views of security that have evolved
from current theory and practice For reasons of space we only give a sketch
of these properties and do not introduce and prove them formally For details
the reader is referred to 
First given a system S and a corresponding threat scenario T and S being
strongly authentic as well as strongly available with respect to T then T
restricted to the system interface is a renement of S This corresponds to the
viewpoint that in a strongly authentic and available system the adversary
is not able to inuence the system at all When additionally including the
adversary interface and requiring strong condentiality the threat scenario is
a renement of the system running in parallel with the adversary note that in
Focus parallel composition of systems means that the systems run without
mutual interaction
As expected authenticity integrity and strong condentiality turn out to
be safety properties Thus they allow for inductive proofs In  this fact
is exploited by providing an interface between our approach and Paulson s in
ductive proof method  If time constraints apply for instance by requiring
maximum response times to requests even availability turns out to be a safety
property
The security relations as dened above in general are not preserved by
renement The reason lies in the fact that threat scenarios may arbitrar
ily modify system behaviour for instance by replacing components However
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there is good hope that restricted situations can be dened that are both prac
tically relevant and that preserve security by renement An example is given
by authenticity properties with respect to protocol specications Protocols
can be specied in the equational specication style of Focus and allow to
identify runs and associate input and output messages to them The detailed
investigation of renement properties of our approach is subject to further
research
 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a formal characterization of security by incor
porating descriptions of attack situations given by a threat scenario Security
is dened as a relation between system and threat scenario determining the
tolerable deviations in system behavior in case of attacks System and threat
scenario specications are given in Focus with their semantics given by re
lations on complete input and output histories modeled by streams The ap
proach shows some properties that are considered to be important in practice
First it is mechanism independent by extensionally dening security consider
ing only externally visible behaviour Compared to other approaches security
does not necessarily refer to notions like protocols protocol entities runs etc
However if reference to abstract mechanisms turns out to be necessary ap
propriate threat scenario extensions are able to cover these additional aspects
This is used in a avor of the approach covering the analysis of cryptographic
protocols
In our approach the abstraction level of security specications can be cho
sen according to the demands of the task at hand Some system structure
must be already given in order to construct the threat scenario but the se
curity engineer is free to incorporate those details in the threat scenario that
he considers to be relevant This decision will be driven by the results of
threat identication and risk analysis thus there is a close correspondence
to informal but practically established methods Our approach is not biased
towards particular application scenarios like for instance securing communi
cation links Since Focus supports the complete development process from
requirements engineering to implementation implementation issues can be
straightforwardly integrated though not being explicitly described here
Altogether our formal characterization of security seems to be appropri
ate when compared to informal and formal notions occurring in the literature
However there is still work to be done For instance the properties of the for
mal denitions have to be further investigated eg with respect to renement
Considering relevant practical applications it is important to provide generic
threat scenarios applicable to typical situations Thus we aim at an important
contribution towards a practically useful routinely applicable formal method
for the development of secure systems covering a wide wide range of today s
security development tasks
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